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A COMMENT:
THE ANTITRUST CHALLENGE TO
PROFESSIONALISM
CLARK C. HAVIGHURST*
Professor Clark has performed a useful service in documenting
ways in which the medical profession still largely controls its own envi-
ronment, even after a period of regulatory incursions in the health serv-
ices industry. Even though physicians claim to feel overburdened and
more constrained than ever by regulation, they still are not accountable
for the costs they impose on the nation. Professor Clark demonstrates
the surprising extent to which American society continues to accept the
costs of professional consensus and self-regulation instead of insisting
that providers of medical care submit to the discipline of either public
regulation or the competitive marketplace.
In reviewing manifestations of public deference to the medical
profession, Professor Clark omits reference to the example that inter-
ests me most - namely, the virtual exemption from the antitrust laws
that the so-called "learned professions" enjoyed from the enactment of
the Sherman Act in 1890' until the mid-1970's. Although that exemp-
tion was more de facto than de jure, occasional judicial dicta supported
the notion that the organized professions should not be subject to the
usual rules designed to protect free enterprise. The most famous judi-
cial statement of medicine's special position appeared in a 1952 anti-
trust case2 in which the government alleged, but failed to prove,3 a
profession-sponsored boycott against Oregon health insurers that in-
sisted on holding individual physicians responsible for controlling the
costs of care.4 Although such a coercive, anticompetitive boycott ordi-
narily would be regarded as an indefensible exercise of private regula-
tory power by an "extra-governmental agency" that " 'trenches upon
* A.B. 1955, Princeton University; J.D. 1958, Northwestern University. Professor of
Law, Duke University School of Law.
1. 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)).
2. United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
3. The trial court's findings seem to have reflected a strong professional bias. See id. at
331 (referring to the judge's "irrelevant soliloquies on socialized medicine, socialized law,
and the like, which .. .do not add strength or persuasiveness to his opinion").
4. For a review of the record in this case, revealing the insurers' cost-containment ef-
forts that incensed physicians, see Goldberg & Greenberg, The Effect ofPhysician-Controlled
Health Insurance: U.S. v. Oregon State Medical Society, 2 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 48
(1977).
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the power of the national legislature,' "I the Supreme Court disclosed a
tolerant disposition toward professional restraints:
Since no concerted refusal to deal with private health associa-
tions has been proved, we need not decide whether it would violate
the antitrust laws. We might observe in passing, however, that
there are ethical considerations where the historic direct relation-
ship between patient and physician is involved which are quite dif-
ferent than the usual considerations prevailing in ordinary
commercial matters. This Court has recognized that forms of
competition usual in the business world may be demoralizing to
the ethical standards of a profession.'
The medical profession's antitrust immunity may have owed less
to such judicial attitudes than to the federal law's inability to reach
localized conduct not affecting interstate commerce.7 Thus, in Ameri-
can Medical Association v. United States,' in which jurisdiction was not
a problem, the law was brought to bear on organized physicians with
surprising force, suggesting that deference to the profession was not
universal and that the jurisdictional limit was the more important insu-
lating factor.9 In any event, the criminal indictments obtained in 1938
by the Justice Department against the American Medical Association
and the Medical Society of the District of Columbia still represent the
single most direct challenge ever mounted by government against pro-
fessional power. As such, that litigation, which resulted in a resound-
ing victory for the government, also represents by far the most
significant breach in the long tradition of deference traced by Professor
Clark. It may nevertheless be an exception that proves Professor
Clark's rule, because the assistant attorney general who took on the
AMA was Thurman Arnold, a man virtually unique as an iconoclast
among American public officials.' °
5. Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941) (quoting Addys-
ton Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 242 (1899)).
6. United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952). For a full
discussion of this language, see Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health
Care Financing, 1978 DUKE L.J. 303, 344-53.
7. See, e.g., Riggall v. Washington County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1957);
Spears Free Clinic & Hosp. for Poor Children v. Cleere, 197 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1952);
Polhemus v. American Medical Ass'n, 145 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1944).
8. 317 U.S. 519 (1943), a f'g 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
9. Id. A strikingly similar civil case was decided against the physicians under state law,
see Group Health Coop. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737
(1951).
10. Footnoting this characterization of Thurman Arnold was a particular pleasure since
it led me into his letters, which include two replies to newspaper editorials critical of the
AMA case. See VOLTAIRE AND THE COWBOY: THE LETTERS OF THURMAN ARNOLD 274-
76, 288-90 (G. Gressley ed. 1977). As an indication of Arnold's lack of illusions about the
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In addition to producing criminal convictions of two prestigious
medical societies, the AMA case yielded some judicial language rele-
vant to Professor Clark's theme. Confronted with the argument that
the doctor boycott against a health maintenance organization and its
participating physicians was intended to promote the public welfare by
eliminating unethical professional behavior, the court of appeals re-
sponded: "Appellants are not law enforcement agencies ...and al-
though persons who reason superficially concerning such matters may
find justification for extra-legal action to secure what seems to them
desirable ends[,] this is not the American way of life."" Of course, if
"the American way of life" really did universally embody the principle
that public responsibilities should not be assumed by, or assigned to,
private groups afflicted with conflicts of interests, the problems docu-
mented by Professor Clark would never have arisen. Thus, in con-
fronting the issues that Professor Clark has raised, it is useful to ask
whether we are attempting to redefine "the American way of life" or
seeking simply to enforce it - by finally giving effect to an antielitist
ideal that, in this particular case, has been honored in the breach. Be-
cause I like to think that the antitrust tradition reflects the dominant
norm, I would characterize the long toleration of professional domi-
nance as an aberration, a mistaken departure from traditional values.
Just as the history of the medical profession's longstanding anti-
trust exemption illuminates the undue deference that Professor Clark
discusses, recent history suggests that important changes in public atti-
tudes are not only possible but already under way. Since Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar'2 laid the putative "learned professions" exemption
to rest in 1975, antitrust litigation has become an important feature of
the health care industry.'3 In addition to satisfying themselves that
professionals are engaged in "trade or commerce," the courts have
medical profession, I particularly liked the following reference to Morris Fishbein, M.D., the
dominant figure in the AMA: "John L. Lewis and Dr. Fishbein are brothers under the
skin." Id. at 383. The editor's notes to the letters include the following illuminating
anecdote:
Hugh Cox recalls a marvelous scene between Thurman Arnold and Attorney General
Cummings. Cummings commented, "Thurman, this is the Goddamnedest thing I ever
heard. You propose to indict a hospital, a local medical association, and all these doc-
tors? Well, these doctors are leading citizens of their communities, and I play golf with
some of them; you know if you do this there's going to be a lot of trouble and some-
body's going to catch hell. Now who is it?" Thurman replied, "Well, you will!" Cum-
mings just laughed and waved Thurman out, "All right, go ahead."
Id. at 514 n.139.
II. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1942), afJTd,
317 U.S. 519 (1943).
12. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
13. See Halper, The Health Care Industry and the Antitrust Laws Collision Course? 49
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made jurisdictional requirements easier to satisfy. 4 Although a few
lower courts seemingly have given physicians the benefit of profes-
sional courtesy, 15 the trend seems to be running strongly toward the
erosion of such deference.' 6 In each of its decisions involving the pro-
fessions, the Supreme Court has left open the possibility that profes-
sionalism might make a difference, but each of these successive
statements has narrowed the grounds for possible exceptions to stan-
dard antitrust principles.' 7 Moreover, the Court has yet to decide a
case in favor of a professional group on such a basis.
The truest test yet of the Court's willingness to challenge profes-
sional dominance may come in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Society,'" which is before the Court in its 1981-1982 term. This case
challenges the legality of a dominant medical organization's setting
ceilings on fees charged insured patients. Thus, it may turn on the
Court's view of reforms that such professional groups might undertake
in good faith to curb the propensity of some physicians to overcharge
for their insured services. Unfortunately, acceptance of a professional
cartel's efforts to police itself would imply acceptance of professional
monopoly itself' 9 and would constitute precisely the kind of delegation
of public responsibilities to private interests that Professor Clark prop-
erly deplores. On the other hand, the Maricopa County case presents
the complex question of what restraints may be justified by the pres-
ence of incentive-distorting health insurance and thus may turn solely
on technical issues. If the Court is careful in its analysis, its decision
ANTITRUST L.J. 17 (Summer 1980); Havighurst, Antitrust Enforcement in the Medical Serv-
ices Industry. What Does It All Mean? 58 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 89 (1980).
14. See McLain v. Real Estate Bd., Inc., 444 U.S. 232 (1980); Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Zamiri v. William Beaumont Hosp., 430 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Mich.
1977).
15. Eg., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 101 S. Ct. 1512 (1981); United States v. American Soc'y of Anesthesiologists, 473 F.
Supp. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
16. E.g., American Medical Ass'n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101
S. Ct. 3107 (1981); Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 624 F.2d 476
(4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1360 (1981).
17. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978);
Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 368-70 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773,
788 n.17 (1975); United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952).
18. 101 S. Ct. 1512 (1981), granting cert. to 643 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1980). Another case of
interest on the current docket is American Medical Ass'n v. FTC, 101 S. Ct. 3107 (1981),
granting cert. to 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980). Because FTC jurisdiction over the AMA re-
quires a finding that the latter is organized "for the profit of its members," the stage is set for
a declaration by the Court concerning the AMA's purposes.
19. See Havighurst & Hackbarth, Enforcing the Rules of Free Enterprise in an Imperfect
Market: The Case of Indipidual Practice Associations, in A NEW APPROACH TO THE Eco-
NOMICS OF HEALTH CARE (M. Olson ed. 1981) (forthcoming).
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may finally dispel the idea that professionals can be trusted more than
others to restrain trade without injuring the public. One must hope
that the Court will not be led into deferring to a medical cartel as a
competent decision maker because of some notion that professional
services are "different."
Though belated, the current antitrust attack on professional power
seems to provide most of the tools necessary to break down excessive
public and private deference to the medical profession. As courts dis-
cover, punish, and publicize professional abuses, public attitudes to-
ward the profession and its claims should begin to change, helping to
reduce organized medicine's political power. By exposing the hollow-
ness of the profession's claims to special virtue, antitrust activity will
contribute to the spreading perception of medicine as just another in-
terest group scrambling for a place at the public trough. In time - and
I suspect we are nearing this point already - legislative favoritism for
professional interests will no longer be characterizable in Professor
Clark's terms as a problem generically distinct from the general
problems of special-interest politics.
The antitrust campaign also will erode the medical profession's
special status in other ways. Increased competition will give private
decision makers - insurers, employers purchasing health coverage, la-
bor unions, and individual consumers - more reasons and opportuni-
ties to question traditional arrangements and practices. Things
previously taken on faith suddenly will be questioned as consumers
and their agents become aware of new options with different price tags.
Although consumers will always value highly anything that promises
better protection, new cost-consciousness2' could give them new rea-
sons to doubt unsubstantiated claims and to consider the cost implica-
tions of qualitative differences. Moreover, consumers seeking to obtain
the desired level of quality, appropriate utilization, and overall cost-
effectiveness might come to rely heavily upon the reputations of partic-
ular procurers of professional services, such as health maintenance or-
ganizations, group practices, hospitals, selective insurance plans, and
other innovative financing and delivery mechanisms. The purchasing
activities of such middlemen, acting in effect as the consumer's agents,
would trigger cost-oriented competition among physicians, who would
20. One element of the market strategy being contemplated in policy circles is the reduc-
tion of the tax incentives for the purchase of excess health insurance. See Ginsburg, Altering
the Tax Treatment of Employment-Based Health Plans, 59 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q.
224 (1981). This is expected to make consumers more cost-conscious and change their
purchasing behavior. Another crucial element is the redesign of public financing programs
to permit beneficiaries to make cost-conscious choices.
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thus be forced to submit to the accountability that, as Professor Clark
notes, is now lacking. While consumers will always have some unex-
amined preferences and irrational concerns, the competitive market-
place, in which unreasonable demands carry higher prices, promises to
provide the best arena in which to educate consumers and others to the
costs and benefits of deference to professionally developed norms and
values.
The competitive process that the antitrust laws should help to un-
leash also will undermine organized medicine's political power, thus
weakening the legislative underpinnings of professional monopoly. As
employers and other organized consumer interests begin to recognize
the costs currently imposed on them by the legal foreclosure of alterna-
tive providers and innovative financing and delivery mechanisms,
countervailing political forces will gain strength. New political opposi-
tion to medical interests may also come from nonphysician providers,
who, on seeing that antitrust law provides relief from the informal re-
straints that have blocked their opportunities in the past, should per-
ceive new potential gains from fighting legislative obstacles to fair
competition. Finally, competition also threatens further to erode or-
ganized medicine's already dwindling monolithic character, thereby re-
ducing its political influence. As individual physicians in search of
competitive opportunities in an increasingly crowded and cost-con-
scious market become more willing to participate in innovative financ-
ing and delivery arrangements, they will represent an emerging counter
force to the medical establishment. Such maverick physicians will also
play a part in exposing any overreaching and exaggerated claims by the
dominant medical interests.
With this introduction to the possible dynamics of the future eco-
nomic and political marketplaces in which decisions concerning medi-
cal services will be made, I leave it to the reader to assess the extent to
which private and public deference to medical interests will continue to
pose the same problems that Professor Clark correctly identifies as his-
torical facts. Although there is a great deal that might be said about
probable developments in each of the areas canvassed by Professor
Clark, I see good reason to be hopeful in each of them. Indeed, i
would argue that every problem he identifies is quite readily amenable
to some combination of market-inspired remedies and market-oriented
legislative and regulatory solutions.2
21. Even the problem of malpractice law could be solved by market-inspired innovation.
See COMMISSION ON MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA-
TION, DESIGNATED COMPENSABLE EVENT SYSTEM: A FEASIBIITY STUDY (1979); Havig-
hurst, MedicalAdversily Insurance." Has Is Time Come? 1975 DUKE L.J. 1233 (1976).
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Because I regard the unleashing of competition and consumer
choice as a promising strategy for changing both consumer perceptions
and the political balance of power, I would strongly dispute Professor
Clark's conclusion that new and better regulation is needed. His pre-
scription would, I fear, lead us back into thickets where we have previ-
ously found ourselves dependent on medical guidance.22 Moreover, we
already have found it virtually impossible collectively to ration other
people's health care and to resist medicine's expansive claims by invok-
ing the rigorous and insensitive techniques of cost-benefit analysis.
23
Furthermore, regulation is inherently incapable of making the in-
numerable fine distinctions and overseeing the delicate judgments that
are the grist of clinical decision making and of comparing the marginal
costs and benefits at stake in the myriad of small but cumulatively sig-
nificant choices that the health care system makes every day. Finally,
Professor Clark's regulatory proposal seems out of step with the new
political milieu, in which regulation generally is disfavored.24 For the
time being at least, the market strategy is ascendant in policy circles,
and the currently interesting issue is whether the nation will be able to
implement that strategy politically without compromising so funda-
mentally with medical interests as to perpetuate their dominance.
While I agree with Professor Clark that the public is unduly defer-
ential to the medical profession, I believe that the source of the prob-
lem lies in a deeply rooted misconception - namely the view that
medical care is an exact science readily reducible to rules and thus
amenable to central control. To my mind, the attitudinal reform most
needed in the health care industry is a rejection of the notion that there
is a single right way (or a narrow range of acceptable ways) to diagnose
and treat human disease that must somehow be established and en-
forced on a collective basis, either by the medical profession or by the
government. Instead of perpetuating that misconception, we need to
establish the legitimacy of pluralistic approaches within a wide range,
using public controls and professional self-regulation only to address
22. See Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-offs in Medical Care.-
The Role of PSRO's, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 6 (1975).
23. See Havighurst, Health Care Cost- Containment Regulation.- Prospects and an Alter-
native, 3 AM. J.L. & MED. 309 (1977); Havighurst, Blumstein & Bovbjerg, Strategies in Un-
derwriting the Cost of Catastrophic Disease, 40 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 122 (Autumn 1976).
24. In particular, dissatisfaction with the regulation of drug efficacy by the Food and
Drug Administration would surely induce skepticism about Professor Clark's comparable
regulatory format. See generally REGULATING NEW DRUGS (R. Landau ed. 1973); W.
WARDELL & L. LASAGNA, REGULATION AND DRUG DEVELOPMENT (1975).
25. For general discussions of the market strategy and its implementation, see A. EN-
THOVEN, HEALTH PLAN (1980); C. HAVIGHURST, DEREGULATING THE HEALTH CARE IN-
DUSTRY: PLANNING FOR COMPETITION (forthcoming).
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problems bordering on misrepresenation and exploitation. As a partic-
ular example of the advantage of pluralism, I would cite the problem of
technology assessment, which Professor Clark would assign to a regula-
tory body. In my view, the hard decisions concerning cost-benefit
tradeoffs should be left primarily to the private sector and to competing
providers and health plans. Government should assist only in sponsor-
ing research, disseminating information, and policing abuse.
Regulatory prescriptions, such as Professor Clark's, for shifting
control from the medical profession to the public sector embody a uni-
tary conception of medical care and thus fall into the monopoly trap.
Posing the issue as whether the profession or the government should
exercise control ignores the fact that, whoever may be in charge, mo-
nopoly is apt to be wasteful, uninnovative, and unresponsive to con-
sumer preferences. Although regulating professional monopoly might
make sense if there were no feasible alternative, we are fortunate in
having the antitrust laws as a vehicle for pursuing the pluralistic option.
I fear, however, that Professor Clark, far from exposing the false as-
sumption on which public deference to the medical profession is funda-
mentally based, may have himself fallen under its spell. In my view,
the learning process that competition and consumer choice would stim-
ulate offers the only real escape from the thralldom under which we
have long been laboring.
19811
